Abstract. In this paper, we address the problem of unauthorized inference of confidential information in the field of health care and social information systems. More precisely, we will focus on the problem of inference control of confidential information from statistical databases which contain information about patients and propopse a method based on fuzzy logic to avoid unauthorized inference. Information provided using our approach remains relevant because it is without loss of quality.
Introduction
The security of information systems is a very important problem which has been mainly addressed in military applications. This led to security policies which are applicable only in environments which accept a rigid bluk-heading of information and services handling this information. Indeed, these models cannot be used in other domains which also require security policies like for example the health care domain where it is important to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and availability of pieces of information contained in medical files of patients. The confidentiality consists in expressing who has the right to reach which information about which, when, and possibly under which conditions. The integrity is the property which ensures that information is modified only by the users authorized under the conditions normally envisaged. Lastly, the availability is the aptitude of an information system for being able to be employed by the users competent under the conditions of accesses and use normally envisaged.
In this paper, we particularly address the problem of security of information systems in the field of health care and social. Let us note that in spite of the development of security policies in this context [6, 7] , it is always possible for an external attacker and, especially, for an internal user badly disposed, to try to circumvent the mechanisms of access control to the resources in order to attack the confidentiality, the integrity or the availability of information.
To prevent the infringements against the intimacy of the patients, the medical databases must protect not only confidential information, but also information not explicitly confidential which can be employed to obtain confidential information. This paper treats
Illegitimate inference in statistical databases
The main difference between a statistical database (SDB for short) and a traditional one relates to the interrogation interface more limited in the SDB. The queries on a SDB are limited to operations like counting (COUNT), sum (SUM), the average (AVG) and other statistical calculus, which are carried out on subsets of data. Although these operations seem to be without consequence, it should be made sure that significant information on the individuals are not revealed. This problem becomes particularly difficult if we accept the possibility that a sequence of general queries, each one by itself does not allow to deduce confidential information, can be employed to deduce significant information. Let us now give an example to illustrate the difficult nature of the inference problem in the statistical databases. We consider a database, given in Table 1 , which contains information concerning the employees. Let us suppose that the policy of the company imposes that the salary of the employees is a confidential information which should not be revealed. To achieve this goal, the database does not return an answer to a query like: how much is the salary of the employee whose name is Isabelle? since the answer is confidential. Similarly, the base does not answer any query when, for example, the average is calculated on the basis of a simple record, i.e. a query concerning only one individual. Consequently, it refuses to answer for example the query: how much is the average salary of the women employees who work for the computer science department? because the average here is calculated from only one record. A query on a SDB R consists to compute a subset of R using a characteristic formula C, which is a logical formula built from the values of the attributes of R by using the logical operators ∧ (and), ∨ (or), and ¬ (not). For example, the subset of records representing the women employees who work for the computer science department, can be represented by the following characteristic formula: C = (sex=F) ∧ (department=computer science). The set of records which satisfy the characteristic formula C, denoted by X C , is called the result of the query. Applying the formula C on the relation R given in Table 1 , we get: COU N T (C) = 1, AV G(Age, C) = 31 and SU M (Salary, C) = 3200.
Generally, a statistical query taken separately does not allow to deduce confidential information. For this reason, a user with good intentions should be able to form any interesting characteristic formula, and to carry out any statistical measurement on the resulting set of the records. However, it is possible that a user forms statistical queries which can be employed to deduce specific values of a field of the database, which is not acceptable if the values represent confidential information. In this case, we say that the database has been compromised.
A characteristic formula used in order to compromise a database is called a tracker [2, 3] . This formula is chosen so that it gives as a result a set X C whose size is equal to 1. Denning et col. [2] have shown that for any real database, a tracker can always be found.
In the next section, we propose a new strategy to prevent attacks based on trackers.
Our approach
In the everyday life and particularly in the medical field, medical analyses are generally expressed by linguistic descriptions (Example: Temperature of the body is raised, normal, etc). This is especially used for the non-specialists in the medical field. In this paper, we take as a starting point this method to deal with the illegitimate inference problem in statistical databases. More precisely, we replace the results of the statistical queries (quantitative answers) by linguistic descriptions (qualitative answers) in order to limit the risk of illegitimate inference. For this, our idea consists in replacing the numerical answers (e.g. numbers of patients = 10) by linguistic descriptions (e.g. medium) formalized in fuzzy logic framework. Intuitively, each numerical answer is associated to a given class then a qualitative answer is associated to each class. Thus, the formalization of our approach requires two steps: classification and fuzzification. Let us recall these two concepts:
-Classification is the procedure which consists in decomposing the scale of the used numerical values into non-empty classes so that each numerical value belongs to one and only one class. Let I be a set of elements. We say that Q(I) is a partition of I if there exists a set {q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q k } satisfying the following conditions:
i=1,···,k q i = I with q i = ∅ and q i ∩ q j = ∅ for i = j. To be relevant, a partition should be made up of definitely individualized classes. Among existing classification methods, we recall one method, that we will use later, based on the aggregation around the centers using a fixed number of classes. The principle of this method is to determine a partition of I composed of k classes, the number k being fixed a priori by the user of the method. k centers c 1 , · · · , c k are chosen which are either arbitrarily points in the space of the variables, or elements of the set I. Each element of the set I is associated to one and only one class whose center is one of the k centers c 1 , · · · , c k according to the following assignment rule:
i belongs to the class q j of center c j iff ||i − c j || = min l=1,···,k ||i − c l ||. After the classification step, we have to associate an appropriate linguistic variable to each class. For example, if the numerical scale corresponds to the temperature then the linguistic variable which corresponds to the interval [20, 25] may be tepid. This can be formalized in fuzzy logic [8] .
-Fuzzification: A principal characteristic of the human reasoning is that it is based on vague or incomplete data. Thus, to determine if a temperature is hot or cold is easy for any individual without necessarily knowing its exact value. Fuzzy logic has the aim of studying the representation of vague knowledge and the approximate reasoning. A principal characteristic of fuzzy logic is that an object may belong to a set and at the same time to its complement. Thus, a temperature of 22 may at the same time be hot and not hot.
A linguistic variable is a triple (X, V, F X ), where X is a variable (age, temperature, etc) defined on a set of reference V (the set of integers, reals, etc). F X = {A 1 , A 2 , · · ·} is a finite or infinite set of subsets of V used to characterize X (old, young, hot, cold, etc). Each fuzzy subset represents a linguistic description. The variable may belong to one or more subsets of this element of reference. For example, the temperature T = 28 may belong to the subset "pleasant" but may also belong partly to the subset "hot". The membership relation between a variable and a subset is called membership function. In other terms, we speak about the membership degree of a variable x to a subset F , denoted by µ F (x).
A fuzzy set F of universe Ω (a fuzzy subset of Ω) is defined by a membership function µ f which associates to each element x of Ω a value in the interval [0, 1].
represents the membership degree of x to the set F . By definition, if µ F (x) = 0 then x does not belong to F and more µ F (x) approaches 1, more the value x belongs to F . If µ F (x) = 1 then x belongs completely to F . A fuzzy subset is said to be convex if and only if:
. Generally, we express numerical quantities by vague linguistic descriptions such as "approximately 100". The results of fuzzy measurements or an error analysis are modelled by fuzzy sets called fuzzy quantities. A fuzzy quantity Q is a fuzzy set in the universe R of real numbers. It is supposed to be normalized. A fuzzy interval N is a convex fuzzy quantity. It is a generalization of a real interval whose extremities are fuzzy in order to model concepts such as "approximately", "roughly", etc. 
The membership function is defined as follows:
When m 1 = m 2 = m, the fuzzy interval P = (m, m, a, b) LR is called a fuzzy number, denoted by P = (m, a, b) LR and whose membership function is defined as follows:
Then the addition ⊕, the substraction and multiplication ⊗ are defined by [4] :
Contrary to the addition and subtraction, the multiplication P 1 ⊗ P 2 is not of type LR. An approximate value of type LR is given when P 1 and P 2 have a support included in R + , α 1 and β 1 are small w.r.t. p 1 and, α 2 and β 2 are small w.r.t. of p 2 . To apply a linguistic representation to a quantitative variable, the principle consists in breaking up all possible values of the given quantitative variable into subsets (a set of classes of values), so that the borders of the classes are not clearly given. This treatment allows to transform a numerical input into a fuzzy subset. The decomposition should not be arbitrary but founded on criteria, such as the homogeneity of the classes, the uniform partition of the universe, the subsets are totally ordered. These subsets are also called "linguistic variables". The subsets are characterized by their associated membership functions; we associate a membership function to each subset. Their positions and overlappings can be chosen arbitrarily provided that the following conditions are verified: their form should be convex, the subsets (often in the form of trapezoid) should be partially overlapped so that there are no unspecified ranges and lastly to avoid to imbricating more than two subsets. Example 1. Let us consider the temperature input T = 31. According to the membership function given in Figure 1 , we obtain the following values: µ T (very cold temperatures) = µ T (cold temperatutres) = 0, µ T (pleasant temperatures) = .6, µ T (hot temperatures) = .35 and µ T (very hot temperatures) = 0. Now, it seems important to answer some questions : How many classes is it necessary to represent each quantitative variable? Which are the best linguistic values for each class? For the first question, more the number of linguistic values is high, more the partitioning quality is good. It is necessary however that the rate: Card(Ω)/Number of Partitions is not equal to 1, otherwise this simply means that there is no fuzzification. For the second question, we compute the membership degree of each element x to all the subsets F i of the universe Ω. Let µ Fi (x) be the membership degree of x to F i . We say that x ∈ F i only if ∀F ∈ Ω, µ F (x) ≤ µ Fi (x).
Detailed description of our approach
The principle of our method consists, in a first step, to decompose the set of values of the confidential attributes into subclasses of values. Each subclass contains values according to a given criterion. In this paper, we will use the classification method based on a fixed number of classes. After the classification into subclasses the fuzzification comes. We transform each class into a fuzzy quantity i.e., a fuzzy number with a membership function. Then, we associate a linguistic variable to each number (small, large, etc). Next, for each answer provided by the database management system, we compute the membership degree of this answer to each fuzzy subset (linguistic variables). The answer of our system is the linguistic variable which has the highest membership degree. Let us note that the simplest version of a statistical query SQL is written as follows:
SELECT f( <attributes>) FROM <relations> WHERE <conditions>, where f is a statistical function such as Sum, Avg, Count, etc.
In this paper, we focus on queries which compute statistical quantities, i.e. queries which deduce information on aggregation such as sum, average, max and min. Let us consider the example of relation R (patient, H/F, age, sickness insurance company, leucocyte rate) given in the Table 2 (borrowed from [5] ). The number of patients is 10 and the normal leucocyte rate in mm3 of blood is 4500. In this example, we suppose that the leucocyte rate is a confidential attribute. To control the illegitimate inference on this attribute, we will transform the answers to the queries concerning this attribute by giving qualitative answers. We proceed in the same way for the answers to the queries which compute the number of patients who verify a given condition. For this, we fuzzify the number of patients and the leucocyte rate. Let us start with the number of patients and decompose this variable as follows: A first class: from 0 to 3, a second class: from 4 to 6 and a third class: from 7 to 10. We now transform each class into a fuzzy number A i (m, a, b) where m is the center of the class, a and b represent the degrees of inaccuracy. For each number, we associate a linguistic variable (see also Figure 2 -a):
-The first class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "small" = (2, 2, 2) LR , -The second class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "medium" = (5, 2, 2) LR , -The third class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "great" = (8, 2, 2) LR . We now classify the leucocyte rate for a patient as follows:
-1 st class: from 0 to 3000, 2 nd class: from 3000 to 4500, -3 rd class: from 4500 to 6000 and 4 th class: from 6000 to 7000.
We now propose the following fuzzification (see also Figure 2 -b):
-The first class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "weak" = (2000, 1000, 1000) LR -The second class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "acceptable" = (3500, 1000, 1000) LR -The third class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "good" = (5000, 1000, 1000) LR -The fourth class is fuzzified by the fuzzy number "high" = (6000, 1000, 1000) LR Let us now suppose that a user is authorized to carry out statistical queries and she wants to discover the leucocyte rate of "Dulon". Let us also suppose that this user knows moreover that "Dulon" has the MGEN as a sickness insurance company. Consider now the following queries: (R 1 ) Let us compute the membership degrees µ Fi (R 1 ) of the result (R 1 ) w.r.t. each fuzzy subset. We get: µ small (R 1 ) = 1, µ medium (R 1 ) = 0 and µ great (R 1 ) = 0. So the answer provided after fuzzification is "small" since it corresponds to the highest membership degree. 2) SELECT AVG(Leucocyte) FROM R WHERE M/F='M' AND Sick. ins. = 'MGEN' Result = 3500 (R 2 ) We compute the membership degrees µ Fi (R 2 ) of the result (R 2 ) w.r.t. each fuzzy subset: µ weak (R 2 ) = µ good (R 2 ) = µ high (R 2 ) = 0 and µ acceptable (R 2 ) = 1. Then the answer is "acceptable". Note that the deduction of confidential information when handling numerical answers is very easy. It is clear that from (R 1 ) and (R 2 ), the user may directly deduce that the leucocyte rate of "Dulon" is equal to 3500. The case of the qualitative answers is less simple: from (R 1 ), the user knows that the size of the set to which "Dulon" belongs is "small", and from (R 2 ), she deduces that their average of the leucocyte rate (the set "small") is "acceptable". Let us now see what may the user deduce from these two information. For this, we know that the average is defined by the equation x = 1 n x i . It is clear that when n is equal to 1, the average is equal to x i . To see the impact of the fuzzification on the reasoning of the user, we will analyze the use of the fuzzification step by step:
-Let us suppose that the number of patients is not fuzzified whereas the leucocyte rate is. The answer given to the user in this case is then: the number of patients is equal to 1 (as an answer to the query (R 1 )) and their average leucocyte rate is "acceptable", which allows to deduce that the leucocyte rate of Dulon is "acceptable". However, the fuzzification of the number of patients makes that the answer provided to the user (also as an answer to the query (R 1 )) is "small", which does not allow to know precisely how many patients correspond to this answer "small". -Let us now suppose that the user knows moreover that the maximum size of the fuzzy quantity "small" is equal for example to two. However even if the user has this information, she deduces nothing as we will show on the following example: It is known that an "acceptable" leucocyte rate lies between 3000 and 4500. Let the size of "small" be equal to 2. From a leuycocyte average of two patients x 1 and x 2 equal to "acceptable", we may have the following possibilities for x 1 and x 2 : -x 1 = 2500 ≡ "weak"
3 , x 2 = 4000 ≡ "acceptable" -x 1 = 2500 ≡ "weak", x 2 = 5000 ≡ "good" -x 1 = 1500 ≡ "weak", x 2 = 6500 ≡ "high" -x 1 = 3500 ≡ "acceptable", x 2 = 5000 ≡ "good" -x 1 = 3500 ≡ "acceptable", x 2 = 4000 ≡ "acceptable". From these results, one can say that from a leucocyte average equal to "acceptable" computed for two patients, one concludes nothing on the leucocyte rate of one of the two patients.
Note that to have an average rate "acceptable", we have five possibilities for the leucocyte rate for each of the two patients. In only one case, the rate of the two patients is "acceptable". In the other cases, it varies between "Weak", "acceptable", "Good" and "High". So we have four cases with x 1 or x 2 equal to "acceptable" and six cases different from "acceptable". Then we may say that it is totally possible that the leucocyte rate of "Dulon" is equal to "acceptable", but it is also totally possible that it is different from "acceptable". Indeed, we are in a situation of total ignorance. Let us note that in the real case, the database may contain thousands of patients and the fuzzy quantity "small" may reach several hundreds of patients. Consequently, the possibilities of inference are even weaker when the cardinality which corresponds to the fuzzy quantity is larger. The user deduces nothing on the leucocyte rate of "Dulon" when all the possible cases are considered. Result = 9 (R 4 ) The answer after fuzzification is "great" (R 4 ) From these two answers, the user may construct the following reasoning: The difference between (R 3 ) and (R 4 ) (10-9=1) corresponds to the number of male patients who have the MGEN as a sickness insurance company (i.e., the number of patients having the same properties as "Dulon"). With a similar reasoning, she concludes that the difference between (R 3 ) and (R 4 ) is equal to 4 | "great" "great" |= | (8, 2, 2) LR (8, 2, 2) LR | =| (8, 2, 2) LR ⊕ (−8, 2, 2) LR | =| (0, 4, 4) LR | which is equivalent to (0, 0, 4) LR after removing the negative part, since there is no negative leucocyte rate. So we have (R 3 ) (R 4 ) ∼ "small". Indeed, we get the same result as for (R 1 ) after fuzzification. To know the average of the leucocyte rate for all the patients, the user gives the following query: 5) SELECT AVG(Leucocyte) FROM R. Then, Result = 5430 (R 5 ) The answer after fuzzification is "good" (R 5 ) To compute the average of the leucocyte rate of all the patients different from "Dulon", the user gives the following query: 6) SELECT AVG(Leucocyte) FROM R WHERE NOT (M/F='M' AND Sick. ins.='MGEN'), Result = 5644 (R 6 ) The answer after fuzzification is "high" (R 6 ) In the case of numerical answers, to know the leucocyte rate of "Dulon", the user computes the following value: 10 * 5430 − 9 * 5644 = 3500. With a similar reasoning, in the case of qualitative answers, she may try to proceed in the following way. The leucocyte rate of "Dulon" is equal to: | ((R 3 ) ⊗ (R 5 )) ((R 4 ) ⊗ (R 6 )) | ∼| (−8000, 38000, 38000) LR |. From the obtained number, the user deduces nothing because the leucocyte rate is never negative. Even if she can deduce some information (if the fuzzification is changed), the situation is similar to the first case since the user does not know the exact number of patients. Let us also note that we lost the precision on the computation of the leucocyte rate because of the multiplication which we carried out (recall that in the case of the multiplication, the computation is only approximate).
We have shown on this example that the user may use different ways to deduce confidential information however the use of qualitative answers makes difficult the implementation of attacks by trackers because after fuzzification, it is difficult to identify the individual concerned by the confidential information. Indeed, required information is not distinguished after fuzzification.
Conclusion
We have proposed a first attempt to limit the risk of inference of confidential information from a database using fuzzy logic. It is difficult to affirm here that we eliminate any risk of illegal inference. The goal is nevertheless to continue to answer the queries as well as possible using non-confidential information. So our aim is to limit at least as possible the restrictions of legitimate access on databases while ensuring that the risk of unauthorized inference remains below an acceptable threshold.
An immediate prospect for this work would be to implement our approach and to validate it on great databases. We showed in this paper that our approach particularly enables us to control the attacks by trackers. We expect to see how this approach could be used to control other types of attacks like linear systems [2, 1] . Lastly, it would be interesting to see to what extent our approach is sensitive to the classification method used, i.e. to see if the use of other classification methods give sensitively different results.
